主题： Pre-Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information
报告人：Lan Zhang Southwest University of Finance and Economics Associate professor
Lan Zhang is currently an associate professor in the Research Institute of Economics and Management (RIEM) at Southwest University of Finance and Economics. He received his Ph.D in Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, in 2010. His research interest includes: Managerial economics, Game theory and applied economics.
We study several pre-communication protocols in a coordination game with incomplete information. Under decentralized decision making, we show that informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium, yet miscoordination arises with positive probabilities. Moreover, the equilibrium takes a partitional structure and essages are rank ordered, with higher messages becoming increasingly imprecise. Compared to centralized decision making (a mediator without commitment), decentralization leads to more informative communication when the miscoordination cost is high, and decentralization performs better when the miscoordination cost is neither too low nor too high. We also study the case in which the mediator is able to commit to a decision rule beforehand.